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The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is spreading to Pacific 
Island countries (PICs), posing a severe threat to their economies 
and human security. Donors are aiding the region. For example, 
the United States has provided over US$32 million to PICs. 
Australia announced AU$10.5 million as budget support to Fiji. 
The challenges created by the pandemic provide an opportunity 
for traditional and new players to compete for influence. This 
paper briefly examines China’s ‘COVID-19 diplomacy’ as it is the 
largest new player in the region and argues that the pandemic 
may have geopolitical consequences.
China’s COVID-19 diplomacy in the Pacific consists of 
four types of activities. The first is foreign aid targeted to 
assist during the pandemic. China announced the donation of 
US$1.9 million to PICs to fund grants and medical supplies such 
as facial masks, protective clothing, thermometers and gloves. 
For example, China donated US$300,000, US$200,000 and 
US$100,000 in cash to Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa and 
Vanuatu respectively.
Sharing information is the second activity. On 10 March 
2020, the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs, 
custodian of China–PICs relations at China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Department of International Cooperation at 
China’s National Health Commission co-organised a video 
conference with senior health officials and experts from China’s 
ten partner PICs. The Chinese side briefed the audience on 
COVID-19 control in China and pledged to support PICs in the 
battle against the virus and take care of Pacific Islanders living 
and studying in China. A second video conference was held 
between Chinese and Kiribati health officials in late March. These 
conferences can be interpreted as proactive diplomatic efforts by 
China to engage with PICs on COVID-19 and build an image as 
a responsible development partner.
Third, China is actively reaching out to the mainstream 
media in the Pacific and at home to publicise China’s support 
during the pandemic. Chinese ambassadors have published 
articles in newspapers in PICs such as Fiji, PNG, Samoa and 
Tonga to showcase China’s achievements in COVID-19 control 
at home and display a willingness to support these countries. 
Zhou Haicheng, China’s Ambassador to Vanuatu, also wrote a 
piece for China’s largest newspaper People’s Daily in February, 
thanking Vanuatu for being the first government in the Pacific 
to donate 10 million vatu (US$92,764) to help China combat 
COVID-19. Similarly, the Chinese embassy in PNG published 
news on the fundraising lunch attended by Prime Minister James 
Marape to support China’s efforts in response to the pandemic 
and the donation of 100,000 kina from the Eastern Highlands 
Province to China. China also reported on its facilitation of the 
homeward journey of 50 Tongan athletes and one coach in 
March after they finished a 60-day training program in China.
To expand its outreach to Pacific communities, Chinese 
embassies have even opened Facebook and Twitter accounts, a 
seemingly orchestrated action directed by Beijing, as Facebook 
and Twitter are blocked in China. Chinese embassies have also 
republished favourable articles written by Pacific students in 
China. For example, the Chinese embassy in Fiji republished 
a Fiji Sun article written by a Fijian student studying in Wuhan 
who had applauded China’s efforts in controlling the virus 
and said he would stay in Wuhan rather than return to Fiji. 
These messages are used by the Chinese government as 
much-needed ammunition in response to attacks on its handling 
of COVID-19 at home.
The fourth activity involves Chinese communities and medical 
teams in PICs and philanthropic organisations in China. With the 
donation of 20,000 kina from Chinese communities in PNG’s 
Madang Province, local health authorities launched a COVID-19 
awareness campaign in February. Following instructions from 
Chinese embassies, Chinese medical teams have been active 
in raising COVID-19 awareness among local communities and 
supporting the treatment. The team in Samoa lent support to 
Samoan health authorities in drafting COVID-19 prevention and 
control guidelines. The Jack Ma Foundation — a philanthropic 
organisation in China — also donated 50,000 KN95 facial masks 
and 20,000 protective masks to Fiji, PNG, New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia in April, which marked the first delivery of 
medical supplies through the Pacific Humanitarian Pathway on 
COVID-19 established by the Pacific Islands Forum.
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The above activities form part of China’s COVID-19 
diplomatic efforts to project a positive image and reduce the 
pressure it faces in handling the virus, which first broke out in 
Wuhan. China is also linking its COVID-19-related aid program 
to President Xi Jinping’s diplomatic concept of ‘building a 
community of common destiny’. The Chinese Ambassador to 
PNG, Xue Bing, wrote in the Post Courier and The National 
newspapers that ‘fighting COVID-19 calls for building global 
community’. Deng Boqing, Deputy Chairman of the China 
International Development Cooperation Agency, said in March 
2020 that China’s COVID-19 assistance overseas is China’s 
‘most concentrated and wide-ranging emergency humanitarian 
action’ in history; ‘offering such support … is crucial for China to 
… live up to the vision of a community with a shared future for 
mankind’. Clearly, the Chinese government is attempting to turn 
the COVID-19 crisis into a new diplomatic opportunity, with a 
whole-of-government approach deploying diplomats, aid officials 
and official media in full swing.
The responses of PICs to China’s COVID-19 diplomacy are 
mixed. Feedback from some Pacific government officials seems 
positive. In March 2020, Vanuatu’s then minister of foreign affairs, 
international cooperation and external trade, Ralph Regenvanu, 
thanked China for providing aid to battle the virus and highlighted 
the friendship between the two governments. PNG’s Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Patrick Pruaitch expressed 
appreciation for China’s support to PICs in the fight against 
COVID-19. Reactions from some other groups in the Pacific are 
less rosy. Despite the Chinese government’s reassurance, some 
Pacific students in China expressed concerns for their personal 
safety. As The National in PNG reported in January, more than 
20 PNG students studying at universities around Wuhan, who 
feared infection, pleaded for PNG government support to 
evacuate them. Two Fijian students were evacuated from Wuhan 
by Air New Zealand and they expressed gratitude to the New 
Zealand government.
The scope of COVID-19 spread in the Pacific is yet to be 
known. Further spread is likely to spark more Chinese aid to the 
region in the short term. COVID-19 will also have a significant 
impact on China–Pacific relations. The crisis has already stopped 
the flows of Chinese tourists into the region due to the extensive 
travel restrictions imposed by PICs. Economically, this is a blow 
to many PICs, as tourism is a pillar industry and China is their 
fastest-growing market in the past decade. China’s demands  for 
natural resources from the Pacific, such as timber and minerals, 
are also expected to decrease due to the economic slowdown 
at home. COVID-19 could also delay existing Chinese aid 
projects unrelated to COVID-19 efforts. As the Fiji Sun reported 
in March, around 20 Chinese workers involved in the Rewa 
water supply project in Fiji were stranded in China because of 
COVID-19-related travel restrictions. In April, the governments 
of China and Solomon Islands, the latter having switched to 
China in last September, exchanged letters on funding the 2023 
Pacific Games-related infrastructure in Solomon Islands with 
about US$100 million from China. However, COVID-19-related 
travel restrictions could easily disrupt these projects if the crisis 
extends.
More broadly, China’s rise in the Pacific could be affected. 
From an economic perspective, COVID-19 will have a severe 
impact on China’s economic growth (both at home and exports 
overseas), which will directly affect the Chinese aid budget. This 
may lead to a decrease in both Chinese aid and presence in 
the Pacific and make it difficult for China to bankroll the planned 
Belt and Road activities. Equally important, in the post COVID-
19 era, relations between the world’s major powers and China 
could undergo radical changes. As the UK Foreign Secretary 
Dominic Raab said in April, a review is needed to investigate 
how COVID-19 spread from China and further, that ‘business as 
usual’ with China is not possible after the crisis. The Australian 
government has also called for an independent international 
inquiry into the origins of the pandemic in China, which received 
push back from China. A strained relationship between China 
and traditional powers could easily spill into the Pacific where 
a revitalised geopolitical competition has taken place in recent 
years. Relationships between PICs and China could be tested 
then.
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